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2 EQUI-PROBABLE PRIORS
Summary: How to form priors that do not seem artificial or arbitrary
is a central question in Bayesian statistics. The case of forming a prior
on the truth of a proposition for which there is no evidence, and the
definte evidence that the event can happen in a finite set of ways, is
detailed. The truth of a propostion of this kind is frequently assigned
a prior of 0.5 via arguments of ignorance, randomness, the Principle of
Indiffernce, the Principal Principal, or by other methods. These are all
shown to be flawed. The statistical syllogism introduced by Williams
in 1947 is shown to fix the problems that the other arguments have.
An example in the context of model selection is given.
Key words: Induction; Logical Probability; Model selection; Princi-
ple of Indifference; Principal Principle; Prior formation.
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1. Introduction
There are (at least) two central foundational problems in statistics:
how to justify a given probability model, and how to assign prior prob-
abilities to its parameters. The goal of both of these operations is to
insure that they are not seen to be arbitrary, or appear to be guided
by the subjective whim of the user, and that they logically follow from
the explicit evidence that is given or assumed to be known.
As is well known, concepts such as exchangeability, symmetry, and
even direct appeals to physics or biology are sometimes given to answer
the first question. Just as well known, however, is that frequently no
justification other than habit—or ignorance of any alternative—is used
to guide a user to select a particular model. I do not attempt to examine
model correctness here. I take models as given, and instead look at the
second question of prior assignment.
That problem is huge, so here I only take a small piece of it: how to
form a prior on the truth of an event in two situations: when nothing
is known about event other than that it could happen, and when we
know that the event can happen in a certain number of finite ways.
First, it is useful to recall, what is often forgotten, that—both de-
ductive and non-deductive—statements of logic are nothing more than
the study between relations, and only between the relations explicitly
stated. How true is one thing given another? is the usual, and the only,
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question. The existence and characteristics of the relations themselves
is left to other disciplines. Forgetting this distinction can lead, and has
lead, to unnecessary arguments about the nature of logical probability.
My attempt here, is to clear up some of the controversies in the con-
text of prior formation on the truth of an elementary propostion. An
example in model selection will be given.
The meta-logic I assume to evaluate the arguments of this paper is
classical (Schechter, 2005). So, suppose p is a premise and q a conclu-
sion to the argument from p to q. We may write this in many ways,
but one of the clearest is this:
p
q
(1)
which is to be read, “(the proposition) p (is true) therefore (the propo-
sition) q (is true).” Logical probability makes statements like this:
a ≤ Pr(q|p) ≤ b. (2)
I take, from Cox (1961), and like those before him (de Laplace, 1996;
Jeffreys, 1998; Keynes, 2004; Jaynes, 2003), that the values of the con-
stants are a = 0 and b = 1, and that if those limits apply to the
conclusion q of a given argument, then q is, respectively, certainly false
or certainly true. When those limits are reached, which is rarely, and
even never, in the world of statistics, then the logical connective (be-
tween q and p) is said to be deductive. If the limits are not reached,
then the logical connective is said to be non-deductive. Non-deductive
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arguments may be inductive, or they may be otherwise. The argu-
ments from p to q are either valid if they are deductive, or invalid if
they are not deductive. Invalid does not imply unreasonable; neither
does deductive imply reasonable.
Here is a simple example of a deductive argument that is not reason-
able (in the sense of relevance) adapted from from Schechter (2005):
“If it is raining now, then red is a color. It is raining now. Therefore,
red is a color.” This is a valid argument in classical logic because the
implication is always true, as red is certainly a color.
Inductive arguments—which are argument from contingent premisses
which are, or could have been, observed, to a contingent conclusion
about something that has not been, and may not be able to be, observed—
are, of course, central to probability. In an earlier paper (Briggs, 2006),
I started with an example of an inductive argument which everybody
believes is reasonable. That was, (p =)Because all the many flames ob-
served before have been hot, that (q =) this flame will be hot. Notice
that no measure of reasonableness is given, no measure of how true the
conclusion q is with respect to its premiss. We can give such a mea-
sure, and that we can do so is explained using the principles of logical
probability (which I do not prove here; but see the references below:
if you are not yet convinced that probability as logic is the correct in-
terpretation of probability, pretend that it true is for the course of this
paper).
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The flames argument is inductive. Not all non-deductive arguments
are inductive. Carnap (1950), the undisputed point scorer for logical
probability in the 20th century, unfortunately had the habit of calling
all non-deductive inferences ‘inductive’, which, among other things,
lead to a confusion about what logical probability is, and it is this
confusion that is in part responsible for logical probability’s current
refugee status (Stove, 1973, 1986). In any case, I do not follow Carnap’s
terminology here.
For an example of a common, non-inductive (and non-deductive) ar-
gument, suppose M is any non-contradictory contingent (not logically
necessary) fact or proposition, and t any tautology. The argument:
t
M
(3)
is not valid (and is read “t, therefore M”). Writing out details in this
manner makes clear the tacit process of argumentation that is part of
any prior probability assignment: all of our evidence is first amassed
and then explicitly laid out before the probability assignment is made.
We are interested in the probability that M is true given t. The most
common tautology used in cases like this is t =“M can be true or false.”
The principles of logical probability gives:
0 < Pr(M |t) < 1. (4)
And that is the best we can ever do knowing only t thatM is contingent
(e.g., Keynes (2004)). This is a point well worth reflecting upon: and
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which is amplified below. It follows from the logical principle that
it is impossible to argue validly to a contingent conclusion given a
necessarily true or tautologous premiss. This result is not dependent
on a particular t; any tautology t′ will do. This is why statements
about the probability of M that lack evidence frequently write (4) as
“0 < Pr(M) < 1”: the missing tautology, since it can be anything, is
implied. This is usually harmless enough, but it can lead to troubles.
Now, the probability statement (4) represents the best that can be
said in the face of no evidence, except for the evidence that we know
M is contingent: (4) is, or should be, the prior assigned in the face of
true ignorance. Since this prior is not definite, we cannot move towards
definitness unless we learn something more about M .
Some statisiticians—of the (subjective) Bayesian persuasion—would
not like to settle for (4), which is a vague enough statement about M ,
and would insist that we find some concrete real number r such that
Pr(M |t) = r. To find this number, there is usually an appeal, to the
utterers of (4), to announce some subjective opinion they might have
about M , or even, if it can be believed, about how they would take
bets with the Deity (or, for the secular, with Mother Nature) over the
truth of M . This line was begun by Ramsey, and is summarized in
e.g. (Press, 2003). I find this approach wholly unsatisfying. And so
do those who still call themselves frequentists, and who still do so, at
least in part, because of their distaste with the wilfull subjectivity of
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the ‘Bayesians’ and their insistence on using terms like ‘gambling’ and
‘betting.’
I now examine some of these arguments to find an r, and show how
they rely on t and on other evidence.
Not all Bayesians would insist that you must say how you’d bet for
or against M . Some try to find r by an argument like the following:
“Well, M can be true, or it may be false. So it must be that Pr(M) =
1
2
.” No, it musn’t. The first sentence to this argument is just t (the
missing, but implied, conclusion before the probability statement, is
just M) , and nothing has been gained. The step from the conclusion
to the probability statement is arbitrary (as many have felt before; e.g.
(Fisher, 1973; Good, 1983)).
The argument can be modified, and moved away from strict igno-
rance, by inserting some additional evidence, by, say, e =“M is equally
like to be true or false”, which I hope you agree is the same as saying
e =“Pr(M |t) = 1
2
.” The argument is then:
M is true or it is false
Pr(M |t) = 1
2
Pr(M |t) = 1
2
. (5)
This is a curiously dogmatic argument; nevertheless, it is a valid one;
however, the (major) premiss is the same as the conclusion, which isn’t
wrong, but it is begging the question. This is usually and loosely called
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a fallacy, but the conclusion does follow from assuming the premisses
are true, therefore the argument is valid: it is just of no use. (A
helpful way to read this argument is to say “p is true, therefore p is
true.” Attaching the tautology t, or any other tautology or necessary
truth, changes nothing; it is then “p&t is true, therefore p&t is true.”)
There is still the matter of assigning a probability statement to the
conclusion of (5), which is:
Pr
(
“ Pr(M |t) =
1
2
)” | e, t
)
= 1, (6)
a statement which is cruicial to understand: it just says that the con-
clusion deductively follows from the premisses (the reasoning to (6) is
equivalent to that which led Egon Spengler to say, “There’s definitely
a very slim chance we’ll survive.”).
The argument (5) is usually recognized for what it is, and instead, in
their search for r, people will more likely say “Well, M can be true, or
it may be false, and I have no reason to think that it is false or that it
is true. Both are equally likely. So it must be that Pr(M) = 1
2
.” This
kind of argument is sometimes called the “Principle of Indifference,”
advanced by (Keynes, 2004) and criticized in e.g. Howson and Urbach
(1993). It is the “indifference” or “no reason” clause that is start of
troubles.
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So the primary purpose of this paper is to show what that ‘no reason’
premiss does and does not mean, and how arguments for and against
models are influenced by it, and by other evidence.
2. No Reason
In argument (5), the phrase “Both [possibilities for M ] are equally
likely” is no more than a restatement of the premiss “Pr(M |t) = 1
2
,”
which makes whole argument as useless as it was when the premiss
was explicitly stated in numerical form. However, it is evidently itself
a conclusion from the premiss, “I have no reason to think that M is
false or that it is true.” Now, this argument, in its many forms, has
lead a happy life. It, or a version of it, shows up in discussion of priors
frequently, and also, of course, in discussions about model selection,
e.g. (Bernardo and Smith, 2000). But it is an argument that should
not have had the attention it did. For we can rewrite it like this :
I do not know—I am ignorant; I have complete
ignorance—whether M is true or false, but it can
only be true or false.
M (7)
The conclusion to (7) is usually assigned probability Pr(M |t) = 1
2
. This
argument, I hope you can see, is not valid: the conclusion certainly does
not follow from the premiss, and the probability statement is arbitrary.
Here’s why. This argument is valid:
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M is true or it is false
I do not know—I am ignorant; I have complete
ignorance—whether M is true or false, but it can
only be true or false.
(8)
It should now be obvious that the conclusion is nothing more than a
restatement of the initial tautology! To be explicit: saying you do not
know, or are ignorant, aboutM is making a statment that is equivalent
to t. So, despite our repeated insistence of ignorance, we are back to (4),
which is to say, right where we started. It should, therefore, be—but
it is not—astounding that people have instead come to the probability
statement “Pr(M |t) = 1
2
” for the conclusion of (7). I think I know why
this is so.
Up to this point, I have been very careful not to give an example
for M , some concrete, real-world thing upon which to fix the idea in
your mind. This was on purpose. Because it is difficult, if not nearly
impossible, especially if you are a working statistician, to avoid adding
hidden premisses to (3) or (7) once you have such an example in mind,
and then to criticize the conclusion that (4) is valid. To emphasize: (4)
is the correct statement to make given that the only evidence for M is
t and that M is contingent.
To validly arrive at an r, new evidence about M must be added.
These additional premisses have to be of a certain concrete character
themselves. They cannot be anything like “M can be true or false”
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or any other restatement of t. They cannot contain the probability
statement of the conclusion, as in “M is equally likely true or false.”
Nor can they measure some form of ‘ignorance,’ because that is nothing
different than “M can be true or false.” The best—in the sense of being
the most precise—probability statement that can be made given these
arguments is (4). So if we are to find an r what can these premisses
be?
Before I tell you, let me first fill in the blank about M , and give you
a real example. When I do, unless you are a highly unusual person,
you will almost certainly instantly think, “Of course the probability of
M is a 1
2
! What is the problem!”
Let M represent the fact that I see a head when next I flip this coin.
Are you with the majority who insist that the probability of M must
be 1
2
? I ask you why this must be so. But before you answer notice
that the ‘coin flip’ M is entirely different from any other M where all
you know is that it is contingent. For example, if instead of a coin flip,
suppose M represented the fact that you open a box and examine some
object inside and note whether you can see, without touching anything,
an ‘H’. Now all you know is thatM can be true or false. Based solely on
the information you have, you do not know any other possibilities. You
do not know that an ‘H’ or some other letter or object might appear.
You do not know, even, whether a snake may jump out of the box.
If you imply that because the question asked something about an ‘H’
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that the result must be ‘H’ or some other letter, probably a ‘T’, then
you are adding evidence that you were not given.
Back to the coin flip. Why is the probability of M 1
2
? Symmetry,
perhaps? As in, “It can fall head or tail and there is no reason to
prefer—I am indifferent—to head over tail”? But isn’t that the same as
ignorance, that is, the same as the tautology? It is. Because substitute
‘be true’ for ‘fall head’ and ‘be false’ for ‘fall tail’ and you are right back
at the tautology. Or symmetry as in, “Heads and tails are equally likely
because I have no reason to think otherwise”? Again, the “no reason to
think otherwise” is the ignorance argument, and the “Heads and tails
are equally likely” or “indifference” is begging the question.
The anticlimatic answer is the statistical syllogism, as defined by
Williams (1947) in this example:
Just 1 out of 2 of the possible sides are Heads
M is an side
M is a head (9)
This inductive argument is, of course, invalid. But we can now justify
saying Pr(M |e) = 1
2
, where e is the two premisses. Adding arguments
to e about symmetry, or ‘fair’ coins, or ignorance does not change the
probability of the conclusion, because these arguments are all equiva-
lent to adding t or “P (M |t) = 1/2” to the list of premisses. A ‘fair’
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coin, after all, carries with it the assumption that the probability is
1/2: which is begging the question.
Another example. Suppose there are 10 men in a room and just 9 of
these 10 are Schmenges. M is a man in the room. The conclusion “M
is a Schmenge” by the statistical syllogism has probability 9
10
. Note
that you rarely hear the term “fairness” applied to situtations like this
(is there such a thing as a ‘fair’ room full of Schmenges?). This may be
because when there are more than two possibilities for M , people are
naturally more suspicious that something other than equi-probability
holds.
There is no proof of the correctness of the statistical syllogism: it is
taken to be axiomatic. In fact, it may be considered in this sense to be
the primary axiom of assigning logical probability. I have yet to find
anybody who disagress with its truth. Equally compelling, there is no
argument against the statistical syllogism (as described fully in (Stove,
1973, 1986)). It is true that it gives the same results as the traditional
arguments of ‘ignorance’, ‘fairness’, or symmetry give, but it does not
carry the same baggage. The other arguments, while they contain the
necessary and sufficient information that M is contingent and has two
or ten states, carry hidden assumptions, information that is not explicit
and can cause consternation and disagreement, because not everybody
would necessarily put the same value on these hidden assumptions.
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There is no hidden information to the statistical syllogism. Except
maybe something having to do with “randomness.”
3. Whiter randomness?
An objection to the statistical syllogism might have something to do
with “randomness”, and how it is invoked to select, or to “sample”,
say, men from a room. This may seem fair line of inquiry because
of practical interest in the conclusion M . I may want to bet, say,
on the chance that the man I grab is a Schmenge, or there might be
other reasons why I want to accurately assess the probability of M .
But arguments about randomness are, just as are arguments about
ignorance, irrelevant.
If you were to grab a man out of the room randomly: how can you
be sure that the probability that he is a Schmenge is 9
10
? Suppose
you were to “sample” the men by opening the door and grabbing the
nearest man and noting whether or not he is a Schmenge. Or perhaps
that doesn’t sound “random” enough to you. Instead, you order the
men inside to polka madly, to run about and bounce off the walls and
to not stop; then you reach in a grab one. This sampling procedure
becomes an additional premise, so that we have:
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(e1) Just 9 out of the 10 men are Schmenges
(e2) M is a man in the room
(e3) Men are arranged in the room randomly
The man M that I grab will be a Schmenge (10)
Here, I take “randomly” to mean “I have no idea—I am ignorant—of
how the men are arranged”. First, suppose all we know is that there
are men in a room, but nothing else. That is, our only evidence is e3,
which is just another way of saying, “There are men in the room, and
I have no idea who they are or how they are arranged.” Tacit in this
is the idea that there may be some Schmenges in the room, which, of
course, means that there may not be any. That is, e3 is equivalent
to, “M may be true or it may be false”. This is our old friend, the
tautology t, which we have already seen adds nothing to the argument,
or to the probability of the conclusion.
Now, if you did know something about the way the men were ar-
ranged in the room, then this is evidence you must include in the list
of premisses, where it would quite legitimately and naturally change
the probability of M . But just saying your evidence is “random”, or
your experiment was “randomly” sampled, adds nothing.
This should not be surprising, as Bayesians have long known that
randomness is not a concept that is needed in experiments such as
patient assignment in clinical trials, e.g. Howson and Urbach (1993).
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It should also not be necessary to say that we do not need to as-
sume anything about infinite “trials” of men in rooms to arrive at the
probability of M . Some “objective” Bayesians try this kind of argu-
ment in an attempt justify their priors by invoking something called
the Principal Principle, which states
that if the objective, physical probability of a random
event (in the sense of its limiting relative-frequency in
an infinite sequence of trials) were known to be r and
if no other relevant information were available, then the
appropriate subjective degree of belief that the event will
occur on any particular trial would also be r: (Howson and Urbach,
1993, p. 240).
Ignoring the fact that we can never know what happens after an infinite
amount of time, or that cannot imagine a infinite number of rooms filled
with Schmenges, but pretending that we can, the Principal Principle
says “Pr (M |Pr(M) = r) = r” (it adds the premiss “Pr(M) = r” which
is taken to be the ‘objective’ or physical probability of M), but which
we can now see is just begging the question.
4. An example and a brief note on arguing correctly and
completely
Suppose you are considering M1 and M2 as the only competing mod-
els for some situation. Then, using the statistical syllogism and the
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logical probability assignments it implies as above, Pr(M1 ∨M2|es) =
Pr(M1|es) + Pr(M2|es) = 1 and Pr(M1|es) = Pr(M2|es) =
1
2
, where e
s
represents the statistical syllogism evidence. This is the justification for
starting with equal probability in model selection. After x is observed,
then it is easy (in principle) to calculate Pr(M1|x, es) and Pr(M2|x, es).
It is no surprise that this is the same point reached by appealing to
the Principle of Indifference (or even the Principle of Maximum En-
tropy for a finite number of model choices; Jaynes (2003)). The statis-
tical syllogism gives the same answers as the Principle of Indifference,
but not by the same route and, again, without the hidden assumptions.
The built-in question-begging of that principle is gone, and there is no
appeal to subjectivity, which many find so distasteful.
Arguments against equi-probable priors in discrete problems often
center, as they do in, for example, Laplace’s Rule of Succession for the
probability of seeing the sun rise tomorrow (read Jaynes (2003, chap.
18) for a fascinating look at this oft-cited topic), on evidence external
to that problem. That is, certain evidence e is given for the truth of
M , and a probability is then logically assigned to it. But the critic
has in mind evidence e′, which may contain e but also has arguments
different than e, which would naturally lead to a different probability
assignment. This is overwhelmingly true for Laplace’s example.
The naive information Laplace started with was just that the event,
the sunrise, could happen or not (the tautology), that just one of the
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two possible outcomes was a sunrise, and that tomorrow was an out-
come; therefore the sun would rise, to which he assigned a prior proba-
bility of 1/2. He then went on to modify this probability using Bayes’s
theorem, and was subsequently ridiculed by just about every proba-
bilist since.
Why? Because these probabilists had different evidence in mind:
such as their knowledge of astronomy and the physics of planets rotat-
ing about the sun, that the earth had been on its journey for longer than
Lapace assumed, and on and on. None of these different-evidence based
criticisms against Laplace’s (tacit) use of the statistical syllogism to as-
sign a prior are relevant. Laplace’s statment of “P (sunrise|e
s
) = 1/2”
is logically correct.
Along this same line, it is often heard that one must select priors,
either on models or parameters, before seeing the data, lest the data
somehow modify your pure ‘prior’ thoughts. This view is false, at least
in the strict logical sense, because whether you apply the statistical
syllogism before or after seeing your data it is irrelevant to the prob-
ability you assign. It is based only, in the case of model selection for
example, on the argument M1∨M2 is an outcome etc. The probability
assignment “Pr(M |e
s
) = 1/2” is true no matter when in time it was
made.
Here is another example that has certainly happened to every statis-
tician in one form or another. Suppose you are with some civilian who
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knows you are a statisician, and the both of you witness some odd event
(say, a bus passes by from which emerges an ice cream cone, which is
deposited on your hat). Your friend will feel an almost moral compul-
sion to ask, “What’s the probability of that happening!” Some strict
Bayesians (and others) will argue that the probability is 1, since the
event certainly happened. But your friend clearly implied a different
question, one along the lines of “What’s the probability of that hap-
pening in circumstances that are similar, and given you didn’t expect
to see it?” Well, this probability may or may not be calculable, but its
probability after the fact is still the same it was before the fact as long
as the “fact” is not one of the premisses of the argument that lead to
the probability assignment.
5. Conclusion
Logical probability is a much neglected subject in the statistical com-
munity. The only book in many years to appear on the subject is the
(semi-polemical) Jaynes (2003). The Bayesian revolution from the later
part of the 20th century, remarkable in many ways, eschewed logical
probability and fixed on the idea that probabilities are subjective.
I believe that it is this focus on subjectivity which made statisticians
comfortable with words like “ignorance”, “fair” (though that term pre-
dates the revolution), “no reason”, and especially “gamble”, “indiffer-
ent”,“betting” and so on. These terms themselves feel or are directly
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subjective; they are words to put your beliefs behind. And once you
have brought in belief, you make it difficult to discover the hidden as-
sumptions behind your belief. This small paper only attempted to cast
light on a few of these hidden assumptions in the simplest possible sit-
uations. It is certainly not a complete answer to the question of how
to assign prior probabilities in an objective way.
But the statistical syllogism can clearly be applied to all situations,
such as assigning priors on probability model parameters, when those
parameters can take a finite number of values or states. The class of
probability models which contain such parameters may or may not be
very large, but it is at least not empty, though it of course does not
contain the most frequently used probability models, such as those, say,
from the exponential family. But I make no attempt in this paper to
justify, or modify, the use of the statistical syllogism in the case where
the number of outcomes is countably or uncountably infinte, as in the
case of parameters in models like the normal distribution.
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